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PRIORITIES
Edgar N. Durfee
[Among those of Edgar Durfee's colleagues who were familiar with this
paper it came to be known as "Little Nemo," for a reason that will become
apparent to the reader. It is taken from his mimeographed Cases on Security, third edition, published in 1938. Possibly it was published earlier
but there is a gap in the evidence. It did not appear in the first edition
published in 1934 but no copy of the second edition has been located. In
a few places its age shows, for example in the reference to Walsh as the
author of the most recent text on real property, and it should of course
be read with an understanding of the time factor. A few cross-references
and passages directed to classroom or other student use have been deleted
but these changes are minor. Otherwise, with exception of some bracketed citations, the text is just as it was published. Because of its length it
is being published in the Review in two parts.]

note will attempt an elementary view of the whole subject of priorities. In one sense it will be shallow, avoiding
microscopic details as far as possible. In another sense it will be
deep and somewhat difficult to follow, as any elementary study
must be. Its method will be essentially comparative. Things which
have not been commonly associated in professional thought will
be brought together, exhibiting their resemblances or differences,
as the case may be. The emphasis will be on legal concepts,-in
other words, upon lawyers' thinking-but we must examine these
concepts critically, which means that we must give some attention
to their social implications.

T

HIS

ORIENTATION

It is assumed that the reader has considerable knowledge of
this subject, but it is also assumed that his knowledge is of the
, fragmentary sort which our profession has usually cultivated. To
bring this learning into focus, it is necessary to be quite explicit
about its disjointed character. \i\Te have not commonly thought of
the whole subject of priorities as one subject. Priorities with respect to land have been discussed in courses and in treatises on land
law; priorities with respect to chattels are treated as part of the
subject of sales; like problems concerning corporate stock are made
a chapter in the law of corporations, etc. But these lines of cleavage
are crossed by others. For example, in treating of trusts we take
up the priority problems which are generated by that legal institution, lumping as far as possible cases of land, chattels and intangibles. Again we set out to discuss creditors' rights and remedies
and promptly find ourselves dealing with priority problems, touch-
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ing all of the several types of property. So, in this course, when we
came to study subrogation we took the priority problems in our
stride, and later on we shall do the same thing in our study of
real securities. Query whether you have taken any course in this
school which did not bring up some problems in priorities? Perhaps Torts? If so, it was by virtue of careful exclusion of such
questions, for they may be the critical questions in a case involving tort to property.
But this is not the whole story. Even within particular fields,
such as land law, one does not find a well-organized and systematic
treatment of priorities. This may be illustrated by reference to
the most recent text on real property, that of Walsh. The author's
only systematic discussion of priorities is in a chapter entitled "Recording of Deeds and Conveyances." Common law and equity doctrines of priority get one short paragraph, introductory to this
chapter, and the discussion of the recording acts is substantially
confined to their operation in cases of bona fide purchase. The
vital and difficult questions concerning their effect upon creditors
is given one brief and wholly inadequate paragraph at the end.
These remarks are not made for the purpose of disparaging Walsh,
for the point is precisely that his treatment of priorities is typical
of real property literature. Nor is it the intention to condemn the
whole ·profession for its casual way of dealing with this subject.
The reason for this critique of prevailing methods is that one cannot understand the law of priorities unless he is conscious of the
disjointed way in which it has grown up.
In this connection it may be well to observe that the title we
have chosen, "Priorities," does not have any settled meaning. Lawyers use this term frequently, but in the context of a particular
case, which makes it quite unnecessary to inquire how much of the
law belongs under this head. In texts and digests this term has not
been used as the title for a distinct department of the law, except
in Tiffany's Real Property, where it is the caption of a chapter.
As one would expect (words being both cause and effect of
thought) Tiffany has the best rounded treatment of this subject
to be found in the real property books.
Now a word of caution is needed. We must not exaggerate the
disjunctive character of the law of priorities. Frequently authorities from one field are applied in another, viewed perhaps as
analogy rather than direct authority. And sometimes we have been
too much given to doctrinal generalization, ignoring factual di£-
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ferences which exist, for example, between land and chattels. How
could it be otherwise, since related things must be subjected to
comparative study if we are to grasp either their resemblances or
their differences, and few lawyers have even as much as started
upon a comparative study of priorities.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

It will save time in the end if we spend time now in definition
of certain terms which inevitably enter into any discussion of
priorities. The word "title" has a wealth of meanings. Sometimes
it is used to denote absolute ownership-that is to say, the most
absolute ownership known to the law, which in the case of land
is the unencumbered fee simple. In this sense there can be but one
title to any given res, and to speak of "conflicting titles" would be
a contradiction in terms. But "title" is also used in a more limited
sense. A lawyer would not hesitate to say, "A has title to Blackacre," if he believed A to be mvner subject only to an outstanding
term for years, or easement, or mortgage. Again, he might say
that a mortgage has title, meaning that the whole legal estate of
mortgagor (presumably a fee simple) is transferred to mortgagee,
leaving but an equitable estate in the former. How far this is a
true statement of mortgage law we need not at this moment inquire: it is enough to note this use of the word "title."
Next we come to some most interesting uses of this term. Conveyancers, especially when they are dealing with priorities, apply
it to all kinds of property rights,-for example, to a term for years
as well as to a fee, and to a mortgagee's interest whether regarded
as a title in the sense above indicated, or as a lien. If A negotiates
a sale to B of a leasehold estate in land, or a note and mortgage of
land, B's counsel will advise an examination of A's "title." Then,
after a preliminary examination which throws up certain dubious
points requiring closer scrutiny, the examiner might be heard
to say that, "A has a title," meaning merely that his claim is not
wholly unfounded. In his discussion of the reserved points, the
examiner may use the word "title" in still another sense, as indicating the transactions and events on which A's claim restsexecution of deeds, entry of judgments, enjoyment of possession,
birth of heirs and death of ancestors, etc. Again, with a slight
shift of meaning, he may apply the term to the documents of title,
or to the abstract of such documents. But what are the points
under discussion? Seventy years ago, one of the owners in A's
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chain of title executed a mortgage which has never been released.
Fifty years ago, another of A's predecessors executed a deed in
which his wife, if any, did not join. One of the li:r~ks in the chain
is a will of doubtful meaning, or doubtful validity. At each point,
there are possible adverse claims-possible merely, not actively
asserted at this time. Discussion of these points moves in the realm
of probability, and the pro9abilities are weighed, not merely
counted. How likely is it that this claim will be asserted, and how
serious will it be, if asserted? Again, if we pass this title, how likely
that other conveyancers will reject it when B wishes to sell? Finally,
you may find the examiner displaying a dual personality. As
la·wyer, he may render an opinion that the title is unmarketable,
pointing out the flaws which are regarded as fatal, perhaps with
a suggestion that A can cure them by a bill to quiet title 1 but,
as man of affairs, he may advise B that the defects are not serious
enough to warrant rejection of a good bargain. As in most of the
practical affairs of life, relativity is the order of thought. Titles
are seldom absolutely good or absolutely bad, except in professors'
hypotheticals.
Observe, now, that in the conveyancer's senses of the word
"title," we may have conflicting titles, and a large segment of the
lawyer's business is summarized by that expression. It embraces
all disputes concerning property except those which turn on the
rights of enjoyment pertaining to a particular kind of estate or
interest, typified by the nuisance case where each party admits the
other's "title" but disputes the contents of that bundle.
Now comes another of those conveniently evasive phrases of
the conveyancer, "paper title." Sometimes it carries the implication that there is really no title, only paper, but at least as often
it is noncommittal on this point. And it does not necessarily mean
a title which is all on paper, with a chain of deeds all the way
from Uncle Sam to the present owner. Interjection of intestate
succession as the link between two of the parties in the chain does
not deprive the title of this name.1 Neither is it improper to apply
it to a title which originates, not in a patent from the sovereign,
but in adverse possession, provided that the present claimant has
1 Modern probate practice commonly gets the inheritance link into the court record,
as a matter of course, and thence it may get into the records of the register of deeds. In
the older practice, still surviving in some measure, there was no formal record of inheritance unless controversy led to an ejectment or a bill to quiet title, or some other belligerent proceeding.
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a sheaf of conveyances connecting him with the original disseisor.
How many conveyances? Would one be enough? This is another
point on which our profession has not troubled itself with exactness. When your material is relative, you need a vocabulary well
stocked with elastic words.
Now come the terms "original title" and "derivative title."
Each has its utility, and up to a certain point it is convenient to
use them antithetically to mark the difference between one title
and another. Granted that all titles are derivative in the sense that
there can be no title except so far as the state, through its legal
system, grants it, yet there are important differences between, let
us say, a title by adverse possession and a title by patent from the
sovereign with a chain of conveyances from the patentee. We
need a pair of terms to express this difference. But these terms
cater to the natural thirst of the human mind for perfect antithesis. Almost inevitably, we build a classification of titles as "original" and "derivative." Under the first head we put title by admiralty decree, title by adverse possession, tax title, etc. Under the
other head we put title by descl:!nt and by will, title by deed, title
by execution sale, etc. But does that fit the facts of experience?
In the preceding paragraph, we put the case of a title originating
in disseisin, ripening by adverse possession, and transferred by
deed. Such a title is original from one point of view but derivative
from another. Nor is it necessarily a case where the title ripened
in the hands of the original disseisor and only then became the
subject of transfer. Adverse possession can be established by the
aggregate possession of a series of persons who are connected by
transfer. Furthermore, a title originating in adverse possession
may be good as against one prior owner but not as against another.
A life tenant, who could have sued the disseisor, may be barred,
while a remainderman, who had no action against the disseisor, is
not barred. Again, if one of two former cotenants was under disability of infancy, while the other was sui juris, the latter may be
barred while the former is not. Before you can say that a title by
adverse possession is a good title, you must consider it in relation
to the persons who might contest it. This being so, might it not
be better (more useful) to think of title by adverse possession as
derived from the adverse parties? We might say that the law predicates transfer of title upon the fact of possession, under certain
circumstances, very much as it predicates transfer of title upon
death, under certain circumstances, or upon the delivery of a
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deed, under certain circumstances. The factual bases of transfer
in these several cases are different, yet not utterly different. Similar observations hold true of title by bona fide purchase, which
is sometimes classified as original because the vendor did not have
title to transfer, and the true owner did not make any transfer.
Yet you know that bona fide purchase from T, trustee, may give
title as against C, cestui que trust, but not against X who has rights
superior to both T and C, let us say by mortgage. In this case, too,
you must consider the purchaser's title in relation to the particular
adverse claimants, and you would insure this wholesome approach
to the case if you thought of bona fide purchase as a process of
derivation of title from these persons. That is surely a more useful
analysis than one which lumps these cases with the admiralty
decree.
On the other hand, the Hohfeldian jurists say, in effect, that
there is no such thing as a derivative title. The idea that the
rights of A can be transferred to B involves, they insist, a childish reification of rights, treating them as sticks and stones which
can be boxed and shipped. What really happens in the so-called
transfer of rights is, in their analysis, the extinguishment of·
the rights, powers, privileges and immunities of the so-called
transferor and the creation of a new set of rights, powers, privileges and immunities in the so-called transferee. Is this a dry
philosophy? Certainly no one will discard the handy term "transfer." Yet Hohfeld performed a service in reminding us that
there is nothing in the phenomenon of transfer which requires
us to think of it as a delivery of the antecedent rights of the
transferor. His analysis gives us at least as accurate a description
of the results of the transfer. And is it not a better description,
in that it leaves a comfortable place for the exceptional cases
where a transferee gets more than his transferor had? That is, of
course, what happens in cases of bona fide purchase.2 Hohfeld
also makes a place for cases where the transferee gets less than
his transferor had, as when a bona fide purchaser from a trustee
reconveys to the trustee. In short, what this analysis does for
us is to make us quite conscious that there is nothing in the
nature of a transfer which makes it inevitable that the transferee
2 Or do you prefer the analysis developed in the preceding paragraph? The active
vendor may be said to have exercised a power to transfer the interest of the passive third
person. Therefore, there are two transferors, the one acting in his own person, the other
by agent. This analysis is very neat in some cases but gets you into difficulties in others.
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should get precisely the rights of his transferor, neither more nor
less. The writer feels sure that careless thinking about ownership
as if it were a physical thing, and thinking of transfer of ownership
as if it were transportation (aliter, conveyance) of that physical
thing, have done much harm. Especially is this true when the
reification of transfer is embodied in such telling figures of
speech as that "the stream cannot rise higher than its source."
That invokes the laws of hydrostatics, which surely is not in
order. But that kind of thinking has had distinct influence upon
the law of priorities, notably cramping the doctrine of bona fide
purchase. Furthermore, a lawyer is in some danger of failing
to make the most of existing law if he approaches bona fide
purchase problems with the simple notion that "transfer is transfer," and that's all there is to it.
Such reflections drive the writer to the conclusion that a
two-fold classification of titles as original and derivative does
more harm than good, a conclusion in which he has the support
of legal scholars who know more about property than he does.
On the other hand, the words "derive," "derivative," etc., are
very useful in the discussion of certain priority problems. We
could not dispense with them unless we indulged in expensive
circumlocutions. The same thing is true of the words "transfer"
and "convey." In spite of their misleading implications, we must
use them. The course of wisdom, then, is to accept all these words
as part of the legal vocabulary, at the same time resolving not
to let them become our masters.
For the purpose of the ensuing discussion, the writer proposes
to use the word "transfer" with a freedom which might distress
some lawyers. He will apply it not only to consensual transfers,
"by act of the parties," but also to succession at death, testate or
intestate, to expropriation by creditors' process, to subrogationin short, to all the processes by which, in the common parlance
of our profession, one person may succeed to another's rights.
In any such discussion as we are entering upon, though distinctions must frequently be drawn, there is constant need for such
an inclusive term.
FIRST PRINCIPLES: QUEST FOR A GENERAL RULE

The most intelligi~le way to state the law of priorities is
by the familiar method of rule and exception, and this is the
method which lawyers have always pursued, though frequently
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a general rule is taken for granted rather than expressed and
attention is confined to exceptions, or contrariwise, a general
rule is asserted as an absolute, in which case we are to understand that it was simply taken for granted that the exceptions
were irrelevant. In using this method it is, of course, important
to get a sound general rule, one which does not have to be eaten
up by exceptions, and one which is not so obscure that its real
meaning must be sought in its implications. What have we here?
One of the broadest generalizations in the whole field of
law is the ancient maxim, qui prior est tempore potior est jure.
He who is prior in time is prior in right. As phrased, it does
not tell us to what kind of cases it applies, so that, for example, it
might seem to say that he who strikes the first blow in a fight has
the stronger legal position, and that one who buys a share of stock
in a corporation today has a better share than one who buys
tomorrow. Without putting any more silly cases, it becomes
apparent that the time-right maxim is not a safe general rule
for all departments of the law. Its field of application must be
narrowed by reading into it an implied term. Nor is it enough
to narrow it to property cases. If you will think through the whole
field of property, you will find many points where the time-right
formula fits the results which we actually reach, but more, many
more, where it does not.3
Suppose we narrow to the cases of conflicting titles. Still we
are in difficulties. In many of these cases the issue concerns the
inherent efficacy of an alleged transfer, as when a deed is challenged as a forgery, or its delivery is denied, or question is raised
as to the adequacy of the description of the locus in quo, etc.
Again, it may be admitted that a deed is adequate in all formal
respects, but fraud or mistake may be urged to vitiate it. In
such cases, and others making up a long list, time-sequence has
no significance. Even in a case involving issues on adverse possession, where there is a significant time-factor, it would not cona A complete review of property law from this angle would throw up some interesting
cases, all of them, with strong policy factors. For example, you would think at once of
the irrigation problem, where the law of some of our arid states gives the first appropriator a superior right of appropriation, but the common law of England, in force almost
everywhere in this country, does not. Primogeniture was the rule of descent in the old
common law, but it has almost wholly disappeared. In nuisance cases, time-sequence
means something: for example, in a typical case of householder against manufacturer,
it makes some difference whether house or factory was there first, though you would not
say that this is the primary factor in the case. Other cases can be found. But the outstanding point would be that time-sequence is usually irrelevant.
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tribute to a solution of the controversy to say, qui prior est tempore potior est jure.
There are obvious difficulties in the way of framing a definition of the field in which the time-right maxim is a useful
general rule. Yet one hesitates to consign it to the limbo of glittering but meaningless generalizations. Not only is the maxim
frequently used by the courts, but our standard terms for expressing the legal relation between conflicting titles reek of timesequence. "Prior," "priority," "senior," "junior," all have timerelationship as their primary meaning, yet in the lawyer's mouth
they signify, at least as often, a legal conclusion. This speaks more
eloquently than any maxim of the prevalence of the notion that
time and right are linked in a significant way. Let us, then,
abandon the effort to define the jurisdiction of this maxim. After
all, definitions are inconvenient things in this relative world.
It will be more profitable to devote ourselves to an examination
of certain priority problems where the maxim seems to make
good.
THE Two-SQUATTER CASE

A took possession of Blackacre to which he had no title. Then,
before the prescriptive period had run in A's favor, B, likewise
without title, disseised A and now has possession. A sues B in
ejectment. The time-right maxim gives judgment for A, and you
will feel the more inclined to rely on it because other things seem
to be equal. In fact A has usually won in such cases, and, if you
seek a simple rule of thumb for this situation, you cannot do better than qui prior est tempore, though you may do as well with
the familiar doctrine that possession is title against all persons
but the true owner. Either is, however, an over-simplification.
The decisions are in confusion, and they can't be lined up in a
simple yes and no, for count of the weight of authority. There are
several lines of decision, and many cases which require interpretation. One gets furthest toward reconciliation of the decisions,
and at the same time achieves a socially wholesome doctrine, if
one starts, not with time-sequence as his general rule, but with
the public interest in peace. If the first squatter was forcibly
disseised by the second and brought suit promptly, policy clearly
favors the former. To deny him the aid of the state in regaining
his possession, would mean that every squatter is an outlaw, open
to disseisin by all comers, and anyone who ousted him would in
turn be vulnerable to like attack by others, including his disseisee.
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Even with Marquis of Queensberry rules against major violence,
the result would be unseemly. Furthermore, we must not think
of this problem as if squatters were a distinct race living in a world
of their own. In fact they constitute an integral part of the relative
world of landholders, and one cannot distinguish the squatter from
the true owner at sight, as he can, if his eyesight is good, distinguish cock pheasants from hen pheasants. Therefore, if we
declared an open season on squatters, we would be inviting attack
on landholders generally. Finally, if we took this position, we
would seriously complicate the business of protecting property
rights. Landholders who sought the aid of a court would always
be put to proof of title, and that is often a large order, both on
the fact side and the law side. On the other hand, if we protect
possession, as such, against mere intruders, we relieve the landholder from the necessity of proving more than possession, unless
and until proof of more is forced by some showing of title in the
intruder. Even then, we will not require proof of perfect title
but only proof of a title better than the adversary's title. From
several points of view, then, policy favors Mr. A, the first squatter.
But suppose that Mr. B, squatter No. 2, entered peacefully in
A's absence, and did so under color of title and in good faith,
though in fact without title, and suppose that, before A brought
suit, B enjoyed a long and undisturbed possession, though less than
that necessary for title by prescription. Now policy does not speak
so loud for A. Indeed, you may feel that it speaks for B. And
you can make a very good showing for Mr. B on the authorities.
Obviously there will be plenty of cases which lie somewhere between the extremes we have put, and through them policy does
not draw any bright line. Yet the lawyer who has to advise in any
of these sundry situations will be better equipped with the policy
analysis, which points to distinguishing factors, than with the
time-right maxim, which turns on a factor common to all of the
cases. If and when the controversy gets into court, A's lawyer
will, of course, argue the time maxim: for that purpose it is always useful to one side or the other in any priority problem. To
complete the picture, both lawyers in the two-squatter case will
argue legal doctrine concerning the right of a party in ejectment
to avail himself of the title of a third person with whom he is
in no way connected.4
4 See note, 28 MrcH. L. REV. 184 (1929). Cases are collected in 46 L.R.A. (n.s.) 487
(1913); 1918F L.R.A. 252.
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Tested by the two-squatter cases, the time-right maxim seems
to be little more than a statistical truth, like the observation that
juries favor natural persons, especially of female sex, over corporations, or that courts favor sureties. Speaking of that kind of thing,
have you met the maxim, "Possession [meaning present possession]
is nine points [out of ten] in the law"? This apothegm seems
never to have found favor with lawyers, but it figures in lay discussion over the cracker-barrel, and sometimes in lay literature.
The writer believes that, like the observations noted above, it
contains a fair measure of statistical truth and might be useful
to the lawyer in the discharge of his advisory functions. It will
be seen that it moves in a different realm of thought from the
time-right maxim. The latter purports to fix legal rights, to be
realized in litigation, while the nine-point maxim suggests practical advantages, including the advantage of not having to litigate,
and, if litigation comes, the advantages indicated by the maxim
potior est conditio defendentis. For land cases, the nine-point
maxim doubtless exaggerates the truth which it contains, but for
chattel cases, at least for some chattel cases, the ratio should be
99:1.
CONFLICTING CHAINS OF TITLE

It will be seen at once that our heading embraces the great
bulk of priority problems. For that very reason, we must distinguish and classify. Suppose A presents a patent from the sovereign to X, and deeds X-Y, Y-Z, Z-A. On the other hand, without
connecting himself with the sovereign or with any one in A's
chain of title, B shows· deeds U-V, V-W, W-B, and asserts continuous adverse possession in V., W and himself for over twenty years.
We have already seen that this problem cannot be solved by the
time-right maxim. Time is significant with respect to the period
of prescription, but time-sequence means nothing. Another case:
A presents the same chain of title as before, and C, not connecting himself with the sovereign nor with anyone in A's chain of
title, presents a decree purporting to quiet title in V, and deeds
V-W., W-C. Again the time-right maxim is useless. The problem
turns upon the jurisdiction of the court and the construction of
its decree.
Already you see that the case where the time-right maxim
is significant is the case where the two chains of title are interconnected, trace to a common source. For example, A shows patent
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to X, and deeds X-Y, Y-Z, Z-A, and B, counting on the same
patent, shows deeds X-W, W-B. You don't need to know much
property law-you only need to keep your head on straight-to
see that, if each of the deeds is an inherently effective transfer
(genuine signature, due delivery, absent fraud, etc.), and if neither
adverse possession nor bona fide purchase has intervened, the
problem of priority between A and B is the problem of priority
between Y and W, each of whom took a conveyance from X.
And you know that on that problem the time-right maxim speaks
loudly. Of course the same problem would be presented if B
showed a deed directly from X to himself, or if he showed a deed
or a chain of deeds from Y to himself, or from Z to himself. And
it would be the same if B merely set up a mortgage from any of
these parties in A's chain of title to himself, or to some third
person with whom he connected himself by assignment. And so
forth, at length. We have had to lay aside many cases in the process
of narrowing our field of inquiry, but the type-case now before us
represents an immense group of practical problems involving a
great variety of transactions in land, goods, and intangibles.
Conclusion, then: as a general rule, between conflicting titles
both based on transfer from the same source, qui prior est tempore
potior est jure. Now you will observe that this same class of cases
comes within the terms of another maxim: Nemo plus juris transferre potest quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right
than he ·himself has. In one respect, this is a better maxim than
the time-right maxim: it tells us with some precision what kind
of case it is talking about, so that we do not need to tack to it a
scope-note. At the same time, it asserts all too vigorously the
notion that no one can transfer more than he has. The mere
implications of the words "transfer," "derive," etc. are dangerous
enough, but to work with a maxim which shouts nemo potest is
to invite misunderstanding. Without having taken count, the
writer ventures the statement that the courts have made about
equal use of these two maxims.5 That leaves us free choice, and
the writer nominates the time-right formula. He likes it because
it is a bald statement of a rule, with no pretense of putting the
whole philosophy of priorities into one sentence. It also has the
• 5 Here, and in all references to judicial use of these maxims, the intention is to
include not merely formal statement of the maxims ,but the ,use of any paraphase which
conveys the same thought.
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advantage of being more terse, especially in the elliptical form,
"first in time, first in right," and it can even be packed into that
hyphenated "time-right" which we have used so frequently in
the preceding discussion. Finally, it has the virtue of challenging
our attention to the point that the first thing to do with a priority problem is to fix the critical dates, or, as you might say,
to subject the case to chronological analysis.
QUI POSTERIOR EsT TEMPORE POTIOR EST JURE:

HEREIN OF ADMIRALTY LmNs, TAX LmNs AND TAX TITLES

The last point, the importance of dates, remains true when we
tum to certain cases where time-sequence operates in reverse. It
is the general rule of maritime law that one who furnishes supplies to a ship, or repairs a ship, or salvages a ship, gets a lien on the
ship superior to all prior interests therein. It is commonly said
to be a lien in rem. Justification for the rule is found in the policy
of encouraging these beneficent activities. How else can a master,
far from home, get the supplies he needs, or the services he needs?
And it is to the ultimate advantage of those having prior interests
in the ship that the master be able to keep the ship afloat and
complete his voyage. From the rule as stated, it follows that if
from time to time a ship gets supplies and/or services from sundry persons, these persons have liens which rank in inverse order
of time. The last shall be first, etc.
In like manner, direct taxes on land are commonly made a
lien upon the land paramount to all prior interests therein. The
names of supposed owners may be placed on the rolls and personal
notice of assessment may be given to them, but this is merely a
point of convenience and courtesy. As matter of law, the state goes
after the land, in rem, and publication is the only notice required,
if any. 6 Again you may advert to policy-the ship of state must
be kept afloat for the good of all. Or perhaps you wiII think this
but another instance of the immorality of government when its
own interests are at stake.
But the lien is merely a first step, a foundation for realization.
6 Obviously this indicates a rule of action for everyone who has an interest in land:
keep a weather eye on taxes. Lienors are peculiarly apt to overlook this point. Thinking
of their interests as merely contingent and prospective, they are likely to ignore the
hazard of taxes, though they would not do so in the case of property of which they were
owners or purchasers.
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If someone does not pay the tax seasonably, the state forecloses its
lien by a tax sale. And in order to realize its advantage, the state
offers to the purchaser a paramount title as of the time when the
lien attached. But with tax liens, as with maritime liens, the last
is best. Therefore the tax title is subject to the lien of taxes later
than that for which the land is being sold, and if those taxes are
not paid, the first tax title will be overtopped by a later tax title.
Of course the burden of taxes is common to all other titles,
and so we can say that a fresh tax title is, in theory, the best
possible title-as good as a fresh patent from the sovereign, not
yet stained by those flaws, which in the course of the years will
inevitably gather upon it like moss. In the case of the tax title,
however, there is more than the usual gulf between theory and
practice. Tax statutes not infrequently run foul of the constitution, and the procedure of taxing officials is often faulty, and
when litigation over tax titles throws up fact questions, a jury of
the vicinage is not sympathetic with the tax title claimant. Furthermore, even if one can make the tax title stick, its enjoyment is
not wholly enjoyable, by reason of prejudices at which we have
previously hinted. For these and other reasons tax titles are seldom
purchased by others than professionals, the "tax title sharks,"
and these gentlemen are always glad to release a title upon payment of the sale price with a fat rate of interest, even after the
period of redemption has expired.7
We have touched upon maritime liens and upon tax liens.and
tax titles because a glance at these cases of inverse priority is
illuminating. Among other things, we have here a simple demonstration that even when conflicting titles are derived from the same
source, priority in time does not necessarily spell superiority in
right. When it has that effect, it is because the law maker so
chooses. This is not to say that it is silly or unjust or impolitic
to prefer the first in time, as a general rule. At least that gives us
a sensible solution where other things are equal,-for cases which
throw up no material factors except the time-sequence. But that
leaves open the really critical question: how much weight should
be given to the time-sequence when there are substantial equities
in favor of the later title? That is a question which we shall have

7 Land taxes are not always put in this in rem shape, and personal property taxes
seldom if ever are, but we need not examine other methods of tax gathering, for this
is not a study in taxation.
·
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before us repeatedly in our examination of the more acute problems of priorities.
TITLES MORE OR LESS DERIVATIVE:
HEREIN OF MECHANICS' LIENS

You can get a liberal education in priorities from a survey of
the law of mechanics' liens. In all (or almost all) of our states
there are statutes giving liens to all (or almost all) of those persons (laborers, materialmen, contractors, architects, etc.) who contribute to the erection of buildings, and, under many of the
statutes, to those who in other ways engage in the improvement
of land, e.g., by altering or repairing buildings, or by operations
on the land itself, such as grading, ditching, etc. The statutes vary
endlessly in their phraseology and they exhibit vital differences in
the substance of their provisions, which makes generalization
about mechanics' liens somewhat dangerous. Yet the statutes show
striking likeness-their resemblances, it might be said, are at least
as conspicuous as their differences-which is not surprising in
view of the fact that, roughly speaking, they have like objectives
which must be attained by like means under like conditions. Add
to the picture the well known practice of importing legislation
from one state to another, and the egually familiar practice of
looking abroad for light on the construction of local statutes.
Quite naturally it comes to pass that we have general principles
of lien law, a study of which contributes to an understanding of
each of the local systems. In the following discussion, we shall
avoid questions concerning the scope of the statutes with respect
to the kind of improvements, the kind of services and the kind
of materials which are covered. We shall likewise avoid details
of the procedure required for the perfection of liens-notice,
suit, etc. These things are, of course, of first importance, for they
go to the existence of the liens which are claimed, but we shall
assume these conditions to be satisfied and direct our attention
to the priority of the liens, or, as the conveyancer might put it,
the "title" of the claimants.
The primary plan of the statutes is disclosed in provisions for
liens upon the interest of the "owner" who contracts for the improvement of the land. In one way or another it is made clear that
it is not essential to the existence of liens that the contracting
"owner" have an unencumbered fee simple, but it is also made
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clear that, so far as concerns this primary provision, the liens attach only to his interest whatever it be. 8 In other words, the liens
are derivative and consensual, in the same measure as the lien
which the common law confers upon the ordinary bailee who
stores or otherwise services chattels. Of course the common law
never recognized a comparable lien in the case of land. But the
contrast between land law and chattel law is greater than that.
You may remember that common law gives the innkeeper a lien in
rem, comparable to admiralty liens, and some courts have extended the doctrine to carriers. Then modern legislation has given
like security to other bailees, notably garage-keepers. Do you see
any reason why innkeepers, carriers and garagemen should be
given greater protection than other bailees? Could you frame a
brief for greater protection to all who service chattels than to
those who service land?
Derivation from the contracting "owner" is the primary plan
of the mechanics' lien statutes, but some legislatures have toyed
with in rem methods. If the "owner" has no title, or an inadequate
title (say a life estate, or a fee loaded with prior liens) it follows,
on fixture law, that he has no better title to any building he erects
upon the land, and nemo plus juris transferre potest to the
mechanics he employs. But the statutes to which we now refer
provide that, where a new building has been erected contractors,
laborers and materialmen shall have paramount liens on the
building, without reference to the title of the "owner." That
sounds very nice in the abstract, but what does it mean in the
concrete?
If the building is one which can easily (relatively easily) be
moved from the land to another location, separate sale and removal may enable us to work out something, though probably
not much, for the lien claimants, and relief in that form will not
8 The Michigan statute is fairly typical in its provision that, "Every person who
shall, in pursuance of any contract . . . between himself . . • and the owner, part
owner or lessee of any interest in real estate, build [etc.], •.. and every person who
shall ... perform any labor or furnish materials to such original or principal contractor,
or any subcontractor, in carrying forward or completing any such contract, shall have
a lien ••. upon . . . the entire interest of such owner, part owner or lessee, [etc.]."
Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §13101 [amended, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §570.1]. Would
this statute apply where the person making the contract had a life estate?-a reversion?mere possession? Would it apply if his interest were inalienable?-or alienable only by
a conveyance in which his wife joined, as in the case of estate by entireties or homestead?
These and like questions we may lay aside. It is enough for our purposes that the
statutes generally, if not universally, are of such character as to support the rather
guarded statement in the text.
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involve serious hazard to those who have superior interests in the
land.9 But in any case, and more especially when the building is
one which cannot easily be moved, the way to get maximum realization is to sell land and building as a unit, and distribute the proceeds ratably among the lien claimants and those having prior interests in the land. Can it be said that this process involves no
serious hazard to the prior interests? It may precipitate sale at an
unfavorable time. Furthermore, sale under a decree cannot realize
as much as private sale. Then, when we have sold, we propose to
divide the proceeds: how? The only possible way is by valuing
land and building separately, and dividing the proceeds in the ratio so established. Anyone who thinks that this assures protection
of prior interests in the land simply doesn't know enough about
the vicissitudes of the land market and the vagaries of land valuation. That is the practical problem.10
Every story should have a moral. This lien on the building
which the "owner" does not own may invigorate our philosophy
of original titles and derivative titles. You will surely agree that
this lien is not original in the sense that maritime liens and tax
liens are original. It is based on an agreement with the "owner"
who has some kind of title, at least the title which goes under the
mystic name of possession. Furthermore, the adverse claims to the
building asserted by those who have prior interests in the land
are based on a somewhat extreme application of the law of fixtures. Therefore you can say that this lien statute merely effects
a minor alteration in the law of fixtures. You cannot, however,
make out that this lien on the building which the "owner" does
not own is derivative in the ordinary sense, especially if it results
in forced sale of the otp.er fellow's land. All this should help to
limber up our concepts of original and derivative titles, thereby
making them more useful in this relative world of priorities.
A somewhat similar moral would come out of a study of the
cases which have established a lien on the land itself as against
9 It would be too much to say that there can be no injury to them: see Washtenaw
Lumber Co. v. Belding, 233 Mich. 608, 208 N.W. 152 (1926), where an old building had
been tom down and replaced by the building in question.
10 The familiar process of partition by sale between cotenants is different in that
the ratio of division does not have to be determined by valuation, but is fixed by the
terms of the tenancy. Furthermore, the cotenants' situation is one into which they
all have come either by purchase, their own voluntary act, or ·by gift or descent. On the
whole, that case does not go far toward establishing the reasonableness of the partition
sale which we are examining.
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persons who did not, in person or by duly authorized agent, employ the mechanics, but are said to have impliedly consented to
the improvement of the land. An implied agency? An informal
statutory grant? That sort of analysis wears rather thin in some
cases, ·especially if the statute charges those who "knowingly permit" the improvement and this phrase is given a broad interpretation. The point is, of course, that as you move from contract, in
the ordinary sense, through cases of actual consent evidenced by
conduct, to cases where there is mere failure to prevent the work,
you are moving toward, if not quite reaching, the realm of original
lien, in rem.
Yet the concept of derivative title predominates in mechanics'
lien law. That, as we observed at the beginning, is the primary
plan. The lien is derived from the "owner," carved out of his
interest. His interest at what time? Nemo's maxim and the timeright maxim concur in the answer to that question: it is his interest
at the time when the lien arises. Therefore the painter who does
the interior decorating gets a lien subject to the prior lien of the
mason who finished his job before the painter began. But what
of the plumber who installed the boiler while the painting was in
progress? A microscopic application of the time-right maxim
would mean liens for each of these mechanics, growing from day
to day-indeed from minute to minute. But working out that
theory in a court of justice would be a worse headache than unscrambling the bankrupt broker. Furthermore, as you think your
way into the total situation, you will probably come to the conclusion that, as a matter of natural justice, time-sequence means
nothing here, and all those who contribute services or materials
to a unit-job (say a single building erecteq under one general contract) should fare alike. Almost all lawmakers have taken this
view. Put, as usual, in time language, all liens take effect as of the
same date.
But what date? That is a critical question for outsiders,-for
example, the bank which lent money on mortgage of this land
prior to the completion of the building. Here our lawmakers have
split. Most of them have given all contractors, laborers and materialmen liens which relate back to the time the job ~as begun by
visible operations on the land. The rationale is found in certain
policy factors. A lien having priority as of a later date would give
no assurance to one who was asked to furnish labor or materials
at the beginning of the job. Do we want to impose that risk upon
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them, or impair the "mvner's" credit facilities to the extent that
they refuse to assume that risk? On the other hand, a lien as of an
earlier date would be a wallop for anyone who had dealt with the
"owner" on the faith of his title, as yet unencumbered but later
subjected to the antedated lien. To give the lien priority as of the
date when visible operations began is stiff, but we can at least say
that it was possible for anyone dealing with the "owner" to see the
operations, and so to understand what was likely to ensue, assuming knowledge of the law. It should be added that prudence requires inspection of the land in any case, by reason of the doctrine
of notice from possession. So, by a process of elimination, we come
to the date of visible operations. Other statutes, however, have ignored the notice point, and date the liens from the execution of
the "owner's" contract, without requiring the contract to be recorded. -A.pparently there is no way to guard one's self against the
hazard created by that type of statute.
Up to this point we have assumed that, in order to attain
equality among the lien claimants, we must (I) give all of them
liens as of the same date; and (2) make that date controlling on
questions of priority as between the lienors and third persons, e.g.,
those who lend on mortgage during the progress of the building
enterprise. Are these assumptions inevitable? Are they expedient?
In the first place, it is clear that we could effect equality among
the lienors without saying that their liens_ all relate back to a common date. It is quite enough to say that the fund which we are
able to realize for them shall be divided among them pro rata. To
express this by fictitious dating of the liens may be convenient,
but it is so merely because this form of statement is elliptical: it
implies the operation of the time-right maxim. Written out in
full, the proposition would be: All the mechanics have liens as of
the same date; therefore, under the time-right maxim, no one of
them has priority over any other; therefore, they must share
ratably. With all of the implications expressed, fictitious dating
becomes the more cumbrous method of stating the rule of equality.
It is equally clear that we do not have to use fictitious dates
to give the lienors priority over intervening claims. For demonstration, we need only turn to a common form of statute which provides that all the liens "are preferred to any lien or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequent to the time when the
building or improvement was commenced." That states the rule
at least as clearly and concisely, with no use of fictions.
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Query whether the vogue of fictitious dating is due to its convenience, which is trifling, or to a notion; half conscious, unanalyzed, that the time-right maxim expresses an inexorable rule of
law-that in the nature of things "priority is priority," and the
only way .to prefer the later .claim is to make over the facts. Probably, for most of us, this use of time-language is no more than a
habit of speech, but a bad habit if it is allowed to control our
thinking.
So far, all we have accomplished is to sweep out of the picture
a· source of misunderstanding. The real problems remain. Let's
split them up as far as possible. First, can we attain the desired
equality among the lienors without giving all of them the same
priority as against third persons? Merely as a mathematical
problem, the answer is, yes. For example, where the "owner" has
executed .a mortgage during the progress of the building operation,
we could say that liens of A, B and C, who began their contributions before the mortgage was executed, are superior to the mortgage, but the liens of D, E and F, who began their contributions
later, are subordinate to the mortgage: then th·e fund realized from
the property, could be distributed thus: (1) set aside for the lienors
the amount of the A, B and C liens; (2) from the balance of the
fund, if any, pay the mortgage; (3) from the balance of the fund,
if any, and-the sum first set aside, pay all the lienors pro rata.
· That is easy enough, mathematically, but is the result humanly
satisfactory? Even a good communist would not urge that levelling,
-among the lienors, is the sole desideratum. Rather, he would say
that, so long as we have private property, we must have a scheme
of priorities, and in that kind of world, A, Band C, of our hypothetical, have better claims, as against the mortgagee, than do D,
E and F, and it is not altogether satisfactory to rob A, B and C
:of that advantage in order to level the whole group. On the .other
hand, it is not· altogether satisfactory to deny the mortgagee his
natural advantage over D, E and F, though that will attain equality
among the lienors without depriving A, B and C of their priority
over the mortgagee. The problem, then, is one of choice: what,
on the whole, is the best solution, or, if you please, the least objectionable solution? Thinking of that sort presumably went into
the common statutes which protect all the lienors against transfers subsequent to the commencement of the job.
: . Our discussion, so far, has assumed that equality among the
lienors is of first importance and that priorities as between the
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lienors and third persons must be fitted to that in one way or another. Obviously that is not an inevitable assumption. Some
statutes do not observe the equity of equality at all. For all purposes, each mechanic is given a lien as of the time when he commenced his contribution of service or materials.11 Then there is a
compromise position, adopted in a few states. In certain cases (for
present purposes we need not define them) all lienors will share
ratably if there are no intervening rights of third persons, but, if
a third party does intervene, the lienors are divided into two
groups, the one consisting of those who are senior to the intervenor, and the other of those who are junior to the intervenor,
equality prevailing within each group but not between the groups.
Of course intervention of two third persons would give us three
groups of lienors, etc.12
Up to this point, our discussion has contemplated a unit-job,
exemplified by a single building erected under one general contract. You will, however, see at once that there must be acute difficulties in defining the concept of unit-job. 13 Does it depend
upon physical relations? If so, what about the double house, two
apartments separated by a partition wall? What of the duplex, two
apartments separated by a floor? What of the single dwelling with
detached garage? What of a group of factory buildings designed
for integral use, each part inadequate without the rest? Or does
unity depend upon continuity in time? Several buildings erected
for the same mvner on adjoining lots in successive years, each
finished before the next is begun: several such buildings erected
at the same time: a single building erected haltingly, with intervals of inaction because of, let us say, financial difficulties? Or is
the concept of unity dependent upon a hook-up by contract? Any
number of detached buildings erected under one general con-

11 This, by the way, is the furthest frontier, in mechanics' lien law, of the time•
sequence concept: nowhere are the liens regarded as accruing from day to day.
12 See Wylie v. Douglas Lumber Co., 39 Ariz. 511, 8 P. (2d) 256 (1932), annotated
83 A.L.R. 925 (1933).
13 Caveat: The writer is in doubt whether the phrase "unit-job" is current coin in
the profession. Certainly it is not commonplace, and it may be the writer's invention.
Discussion of this problem in judicial opinions naturally turns on the phrases which the
legislatures have used, which are various and in the main uncertain of meaning. The
language of the applicable statute must, of course, be considered, but it seems to the
writer that intelligent construction of the statute calls for recognition of the metaphysical,
yet practical problems which necessarily arise from the nature of the situations with
which the legislature is dealing. It is for this purpose that he features the phrase "unitjob," which certainly is not to be found in any statute.
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tract is a unit job, while a single building erected without -any
general contract (or, as it is sometimes expressed, the "owner"
being his own contractor) is as many units as there are contracts
made by the "owner"? These questions should be answered with
a view to the practical consequences of the several possible answers:
(1) the effect upon the relations of the mechanics, inter se; (2) the
effect upon the liens of mechanics as against intervening strangers;
(3) facility of administration of the resulting rules. The statutory
provisions which bear upon these questions vary widely, and all
of them leave difficult questions of construction. The only accurate
statement we can make concerning the resultant law is that all of
the factors mentioned above enter in, with inevitable confusion,
since these factors form endless combinations and permutations.u
We have dodged the problem of defining unit-job, but we
ought to be clear on one point. The need of defining this concept arises chiefly from the grouping of lienors, whether for the
purpose of achieving equality among them, or for the purpose of
determining their priority as against third persons. However desirable grouping may be, there must be limits upon it, a:µd the
unit-job concept furnishes the most satisfactory approach to the
definition of those limits. But it would be too much to say that
·grouping of lienors is the sole occasion for the unit-job limitation.
Even where each lienor .stands on his own feet, once we say that his
lien dates from the commencement of his work or his delivery of
materials, we must fix limits. The carpenter who works on a house
of Mr. Owner today should not have a lien dating from his work
on another house built for Mr. Owner ten years ago. Apparently
the only way we could escape this unit-job problem would be to
reckon priorities on the basis of day to day arrival of liens,
which we have already found to involve acute difficulties of
administration.
Observe, further, that these statutes ordinarily require a notice of claim and then a suit, each within a stated period after the
end of the claimant's rendition of services or delivery of materials.
Obviously that sort of regulation also necessitates a unit-job concept. The same necessity would exist if we fixed the period with
reference to commencement of the job. The only way to fix such
time limitations without using this concept would be to merely
14 See notes 10 A.L.R. 1026 (1921); 54 A.L.R. 984 (1928); 75 A.L.R. 1328 (1981): 97
A.L.R. 771 (1985).
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say that no lien should exist except for the value of services and
materials furnished within a stated period prior to notice, etc.
Then, the limitation would operate progressively from day to day.
Compare the problem of limitation of actions on running account.
Now we have one more river to cross. What amount is secured by the liens of those who do not deal directly with the
"owner," but with his contractor, or with the latter's subcontractor? The question concerns the extent of the lien even as against
the title of the "owner."
First, without having canvassed all of the statutes, the writer
ventures the statement that in no case does indirectness of relation,
in itself, preclude lien. Rather would he expect to find statutes of
the sort which once were common, giving liens only to the humbler sort of artisans, or perhaps including materialmen, but not
contractors.
Indirectness of relation does not preclude lien: but what is the
extent of the lien? The commonest problem is that which arises
when, at the end of the job, $X remains due from "owner" to contractor, but $X $Y is owing by contractor to laborers and materialmen. Do the latter have liens for $X only, or for $X $Y?
The lawmakers have split on this point. You can say that the two
views involve, on the one hand more use, and on the other hand
less use, of the concept of derivative title. In either view, the lien
is derivative in the sense that it attaches to the title of the "owner":
whether it goes further and takes on something of the in rem character is immaterial to the present inquiry, which concerns the
extent of the lien as against the "owner." But many statutes confine the indirect claimant to a lien measured by that of the contractor with whom he has dealt, or, as it is often expressed, to a
lien by subrogation. This is in the nature of a double use of the
concept of derivative title. In its operation, this type of statute
usually limits the indirect lien to a sum less than that which is
owing as between the claimant and the intervening contractor,
and it often gives the indirect claimant little or nothing. In this
connection it must be remembered that the account as between
contractor and owner depends not merely upon payments made on
the contract but also upon set-off for breach of contract. Hence
this type of statute tends, in practice, to reverse the policy of the
earlier legislation, which was enacted solely or primarily in aid
of those who were suffering from the intervention of irresponsible
and crooked contractors between themselves and the responsible
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land owner. The contracting system is a modern development, and
this modern legislation aimed at one of its evils. In later years, the
voice of the contractor has been heard in the legislative halls, and
the protection of the lien law has been extended to him, subject to
the overriding claims of those to whom he is indebted.15 That is
proper enough, but should the contractor's creditors be limited to
subrogation to his lien?
Many legislatur~s, perhaps most of them, have answered this
question in the negative. Subcontractors, laborers and materialmen are given "direct" liens. This is very nice for the laborers
and materialmen, but rough on the "owner." He may pay his g~neral contractor in full or breach by the contractor may more than
off-set the balance due him, yet the "owner" may find his property
plastered with liens. Assuming that the "owner" has the privilege
of withholding payments from his contractor until assured that
everyone down the line is properly paid (a point which should not
be taken for granted, but should be studied in the light _of the contract and the lien statute) there are obvious difficulties in the way
of ascertaining the facts as payments become due, meaning prima
facie due. Sometimes this type of statute enables the "owner" to
require from the contractor a sworn statement of his accounts with
subcontractors, etc., but query what protection this is to the
"owner" who pays on a false statement? In greater or lesser measure, acc;ording to the legislative disposition of such details as we
have mentioned, the direct lien is a man-trap. Where it flourishes,
the "owner" should (1) at the start employ a lawyer who has had
experience in this field, counting his fee as money saved; (2) take
particular pains to get a contractor who is honest, competent and
financially solid; (3) require from him an adequate bond; (4) retain a competent and honest architect to supervise the job, and incidentally get into the principal contract provisions which make
him an oriental despot; and (5) pray.
Finally, it should be observed that in setting out two clear-cut
methods of securing the persons who do not deal directly with the
"owner," we have oversimplified. That adequately pictures the
two main lines of approach to this problem, but whichever of
these is adopted, many nice questions will arise, each of which,
15 Surely we don't need to canvass all the statutes before we can say that -the contractor is never allowed to dip into the common fund until his subcontractors, laborers
and materialmen are satisfied, at least so far as these creditors have appeared and
established their claims.
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viewed philosophically, presents to legislature and court the choice
of making more use or less use of the concept of derivative title.
Naturally, these little questions have not been answered uniformly
by the lawmakers in either of the two main groups. Result: we do
not, strictly speaking, have two types of lien law, but many; not
two degrees of derivativeness, but many. 16
This closes our discussion of the priority problems which are
generated by the mechanics' lien laws. But we should not leave
this legislation without raising one last question of policy. Assuming all details of the law to have been put in the best possible shape
(of course men will differ as to what is the best shape, but let each
suit himself), what, then, do you think of the policy of the whole
system? There are those who say that the lien laws are responsible
for notoriously unwholesome conditions in the construction industry, viz., that men without experience and without capital, and
even without integrity, can set up as building contractors, being
enabled by this law to buy the necessary materials and place the
necessary subcontracts, all on the credit of the "owner's" property,
and that such contractors chronically bid below actual cost, to the
injury of the whole industry, ~nd chronically fail in the midst of
their undertakings, to the sorrow of all concerned. Without doubt
there is truth in this position. How much truth? Do these untoward features, along with such others as you have been compelled to leave in your ideal system, outweigh the advantages of
your system?17
BONA FIDE PURCHASE

Bona fide purchase presents the philosophical problem of the
one and the many. You may say that all the cases where one
purchases, in good faith, land, goods or intangibles to which his
vendor has no title, or a title less than he purports to sell, constitute one legal problem, and that all of the law applicable to such
cases is one body of law. If it is put that way, however, it is necessary to add, in a mental footnote, that these cases differ one from
another in circumstances which bear upon the relative equities
of the parties and introduce variant factors of policy, with a second
16Authorities are collected in notes, 20 L.R.A. 560 (1893); 50 L.R.A. (n.s.) 159 (1914):
13 AL.R. 1072 (1921); 68 AL.R. 1263 (1930); 83 ALiR. 1152 (1933).
17 See BROOKE, OrHER PEOPLE'S LABOR AND ·MATERIAL IN THE BUILDING INDUSTRY (1933);
Cushman, "The Proposed Uniform Mechanics' Lien Law," 80 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 1083
(1932); comment, Sixth Tentative Draft of Uniform Mechanics' Lien Statute, 41 YALE
L. J. 271 (1931).
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footnote that Anglo-American law has drawn distinctions which
cut very deep. On the other hand, you may say that bona fide
purchase is a term which embraces many distinct problems, which
are governed by many distinct rules, though naturally enough
these rules are somewhat similar to each other and to some extent
have been consciously equated to each other, e.g., by taking the
decisions as to what constitutes good faith under one rule as pertinent authority on the same question under another rule. It is submitted that you will achieve a better understanding of bona fide
purchase if you look at it both ways.
Of course this feature of bona fide purchase does not make it
unique. It is merely one phase of the problem of classification,
which appears in every corner of the legal woods with varying de. grees of difficulty and importance. There are two reasons for emphasizing it here. It is a particularly acute problem in the case of
bona fide purchase. And the primary purpose of this note is to articulate the law of bona fide purchase, to develop the interrelation
of its sundry parts.
The term "bona fide purchase" is ambiguous in that lawyers
use it, (I) as a mere description of fact conditions, indicating that
a purchase has been made under the belief that the vendor had a
good title, with the implication that in fact the vendor had not a
good title because there would otherwise be no occasion to talk
of bona fide purchase, or (2) as the expression of the legal conclusion that by reason of his bona fide purchase the purchaser got a
good title, or at least got a better title than the vendor had, herein
overcoming the primary canon of priority, or (3) as the name of
a legal rule which dictates this result. In this note, the learned e9-itor will doubtless be guilty of ambiguous use of this term. That
can never be avoided unless, perhaps, by the adoption of obviously
technical, nondescriptive terms, such as "abracadabra," to indicate rules of law and legal conclusions.
It was indicated above that we have, in effect if not in theory,
many distinct rules of law for the problems of bona fide purchase.
More than one of these rules is referred to as a rule of bona fide
purchase, but other rules which are applied to bona fide purchase
situations go by oth~r names, such as estoppel, or apparent authority, or go without any handy name and suffer for it.
Equitable Estoppel. We are not now concerned with estoppel
by judgment, nor estoppel by deed, nor estoppel as between landlord and tenant or bailor and bailee, nor with any other (if there
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be other) of the ancient common law estoppels, but with equitable
estoppel (still so called, though it is now applied about as freely
in legal as in equitable actions), otherwise known as estoppel in
pais, alias estoppel by misrepresentation. Ewart's excellent treatise
on Estoppel offers the following analysis of the subject, to which
the present writer adds the bracketed comments.
"The essentials of estoppel by misrepresentation will be considered under the following headings:
I. There must be a misrepresentation. [But passive misrepresentation, i.e., nondisclosure, may suffice.]
2.- Either (1) by the estoppel-denier (pers~:mal misrepresentation); or (2) by some person whose representation he has made
credible (assisted misrepresentation). [Or has otherwise aided or
abetted.]
3. There must be a disregard of some duty. [Query: Does this
indicate a distinct factual element in estoppel, or just a wheel in
the analytical machinery? That is to say, if the other elements are
made out, is not breach of duty established?]
4. The misrepresentation must be as to fact or law-not merely
of intention or opinion. [But this terse statement is somewhat
qualified by Ewart in Chapter VI, and if the writer had been more
familiar with the American cases, he would have qualified
further.]
5. The misrepresentation must be of something material.
[What do you mean, material?]
6. Fraud or bad faith in the estoppel-denier is not essentialan innocent misrepresentation will estop. [Query whether bad
faith is not material-for example, may it not make up for weakness at some other point, say the point of materiality? Are judges
human?]
7. Negligence (carelessness) is sometimes essential. [Query
whether estoppel can be made out without some sort of moral
culpability which can be called either bad faith or negligence?]
8. The estoppel-asserter must be a person to whom immediately
or mediately the misrepresentation was made. [Can we never follow the analogy of tort and crime law-shooting at A and hitting

B?]
9. The estoppel-asserter must, on the faith of the misrepresentation, change his position prejudicially. [May one change his position by doing nothing, while surrounding conditions change?]
10. The estoppel-denier must have reasonable grounds for an-
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ticipating some change of position upon the faith of the misrepresentation. [Can this point be wholly isolated from bad faith and
good faith?]
11. The change of position must be reasonably consequent
upon the misrepresentation or the assistance." [Same comment as
paragraph 10: and query how far the external standard is applied.]
. These eleven propositions Ewart proceeds to elucidate in five
hundred and nineteen pages. Perhaps the farther you go with
that elucidation the less you will feel you know about estoppel,
though you will, of, course, be getting the feel of the thing, which
is· of first importance. You probably will come through with the
conviction that· Ewart's eleven-fold analysis is quite useless as a
succinct statement of the law, but most illuminating as a guide
in your study of the law, as a set of sign posts telling you what to.
look for, which is obviously what Ewart intended it to be. ·
The editor refrains from solving, here and now, the mystery
of estoppel, but will venture a few observations upon its relation
to the bona fide purchase problem. The concept of estoppel could
hfl,ve been applied to all the cases which have in fact been disposed
of by the rules of bona fide purchase, and the results would have
been largely the same. So we find Ewart dealing with practically
all these ·cases; in the main approving the results arrived at but
quarrelling with the mode of reasoning, urging that an estoppel
analysis would have been preferable. Of course, one wonders
whether, if the estoppel concept had been applied to all these
cases, the estoppel concept would today be what it is, since the law
is shaped by the_ cases. Anyhow, Ewart's contentions and our speculation about it gives us one clue to the relation of estoppel to bona
fide purchase.
We get another clue in this, that the estoppel concept is applied to a great variety of cases which could hardly be said to involve bona fide purchase, in the descriptive sense, and to which the
r_ules of bona fide purchase are inapplicable. For one example, "A
man bitten by a dog asked a woman as to who owned it, and she
said it belonged to her. He accordingly sued her. Held that she
would .be. estopped from denying ownership on the trial if she
knew that the inquiry was made for the purpose of finding out
who was liable for the injury." 18 So, in cases without number, the
estoppel principle has barred an equitable action the institution
18 Headnote,

Robb v. Shepard, 50 Mich. 189, 15 N.W. 76 (1883).
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of which has been unreasonably delayed with consequent change
in defendant's position. Here estoppel has taken on the name of
"laches" and with the multiplication of cases we have come to
think of laches as a thing apart. The process is the sort which
Ewart, speaking of another situation, aptly called "thought in a
groove." But see Parsons v. Parsons,19 where a typical laches case
was discussed entirely in terms of estoppel. So one might say that
the rules of bona fide purchase constitute a specialized form
of estoppel, and some of Ewart's remarks seem to involve that idea.
But, if that is said, there should be emphasis on the word "specialized." The rules of bona fide purchase have enjoyed an independent life, not a tribal life in the bosom of the estoppel family, and
they have acquired some habits, good or bad, which are not characteristic of estoppel. So we find Ewart frequently quarrelling
with the results reached by the rules of bona fide purchase. For
example, he is quite unhappy about the distinction which is
drawn between legal and equitable estates. Now we have another
clue to the relation of things.
We might sumarize thus: Estoppel is a very broad concept
applicable to a great variety of situations, among others to cases
of bona fide purchase, in the descriptive sense. It springs from
elemental notions of policy and justice, and more than most rules
of law it has been preserved from crystallization in formulae which
might prevent resort, in its application, to its fundamental bases.
On the other hand, the rules of bona fide purchase are highly
specialized rules, each applicable to certain types of bona fide
purchase, in ·the descriptive sense. They too have, perhaps, sprung
from notions of justice and policy, but they have crystallized so-far
as to make difficult a resort to first principles, except, of course, in
borderline cases which fall where there is supposed to be a line but
none exists. One of the consequences is this: if a purchaser can
make out a case well within the rule of bona fide purchase, he has
a clear case, and there is no occasion to talk about estoppel; if his
case falls in the penumbra of the rule, he may well argue the application of the rule and also argue estoppel; if his case falls clearly
outside the rule, he can still argue estoppel and may get away with
it-you never can tell about estoppel, unless the case happens to be
exceptionally strong, or exceptionally weak.
Before we close our crude sketch of this elusive subject, we
19

101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147 (1898).
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should pay our respects to the famous dictum of Ashhurst, J., in
Lickbarrow v. Mason: "We may lay it down," he said, "as a broad
general principle, that, wherever one of two innocent persons
must suffer by the acts of a third, he who ["by reposing trust in the
third person" is often interpolated] has enabled such third person
to occasion the loss must sustain it."20 Is this not a statement of one
phase of estoppel, that which Ewart calls estoppel by assisted misrepresentation? Is not this form of statement oversimplified, and
does it not contain a patent ambiguity? It is often advanced as an
argument on behalf of a bona fide purchaser, as indeed it was by
Justice Ashhurst. But in Foley v. Smith,21 it was turned against
the purchaser, "who trusted the bank for the title, which it professed to sell."
What Do You Mean, Bona Fide? Now let us look at the rules
of bona fide purchase. We have said that the term "bona fide
purchase" is ambiguous in that it is descriptive of facts and indicative of a legal conclusion and at the same time serves as the name
of rules of law. If it were accurately descriptive of the facts which,
under the rules, give the indicated conclusion, no harm could ensue. But that is not the case.
"Good faith" does not, to say the least, tell the whole story of
notice. To actual knowledge and actual suspicion, which touch
good faith in fact, we add constructive notice, and therewith
whole chapters of technical lore. There is notice by record (involving several man-sized problems,-e.g. the case of defective records
through the fault of the recording officer,-e.g. lis pendens as to
chattels), notice by possession (particularly tricky-e.g. the case of
possession continued from one legal relation to another, as when
a tenant for years becomes a purchaser-e.g. joint possession-e.g.
discontinuous possession-and what is possession anyhow?), and
finally that verbally neat but actually, in application, nebulous
rule regarding facts which would put a reasonable man on inquiry,
-in effect a negligence test. The nature 0£ the problems thrown up
by this last was wittily expressed by Maitland, who complained
that the English courts had gone so far that they demanded of a
purchaser "not the care of the most prudent father of a family but
the care of the most prudent solicitor of a famill aided by the
skill of the most expert conveyancer." In their enthusiasm for
20 2
21 6

T. R. 63 at 70, 100 Eng. Rep. 35 (1787).
Wall. (73 U.S.) 492 at 494 (1867).
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constructive notice, students will sometimes charge a purchaser
with notice of all the existing facts, because a reasonable man
would have known that these facts might exist. Would this leave
anything of the doctrine of bona fide purchase?
Before leaving the subject of notice, we should observe that
there is not one rule of notice for all cases, but many rules. For
example, in negotiable paper cases, possession occupies an even
larger place than in cases of land and goods, though it is not ordinarily discussed in terms of constructive notice but rather in terms
of production and delivery of the paper as an essential to the complete' transfer which makes one a holder in due course. On the
other hand, it is said that the test of constructive notice is not
negligence but bad faith. But we admit evidence of facts which
would put a reasonable man on inquiry and one wonders how
much difference it makes which test is laid down in the instructions. Generally speaking, negotiable paper and money may be
equated, and likewise land and chattels, but one should not place
unlimited confidence in the equations.
What Do You Mean, Purchase'! I£ you agree with the editor
that the term "good faith" conceals more than it discloses, you will
surely feel that the term "purchase" is a downright fraud. For instance, either of the parties to a sale may be a "purchaser," for the
purpose in hand, the one purchasing land or goods or intangibles
such as corporate stock, the other purchasing negotiable paper or
money. For another instance, one may be a "purchaser" in a transaction of such nature that neither party would in ordinary parlance be called a purchaser,-as when money is paid in satisfaction
of a debt. How about mortgages, pledges, and other security transactions? And what is the meaning of the statement, sometimes seen,
that a mortgagee is a purchaser pro tanto'!
Why not rewrite our formula-make it "bona fide transfer"?
But not all bona fide transferees are protected. Value must be
given for the transfer, and the term "purchase" has, perhaps, a
virtue in that it vaguely suggests this requirement.
The law concerning value is Jiorribly confused. The strict
view is that the purchaser must give "present value," excluding
the transferee who takes property in satisfaction of, or ru; security
for, an antecedent debt, and likewise excluding the transferee who
has merely made a promise to the transferor, even though the
promise created a contract obligation. The idea is that the equity
of bona fide purchase rests upon irretrievable change of position,

490

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

such that the transferee cannot be restored to status quo ante when
the defect in the transferor's title appears. On that postulate,
should payment of money or other transfers of property be held to
constitute "value" in themselves, without a showing that they can
not be recovered by rescission, etc.?
At any rate, the present value rule appears to be too strong for
mere human flesh, for it is nowhere maintained in its entirety. A
creditor who receives a payment of money in good faith is always
protected, ancl by the weight of authority, now confirmed by
N. I. L:, the transferee of negotiable paper either as payment or security of an antecedent debt is a holder in due course. With land
and chattels, the strict view flourishes, but several courts have held
that discharge of an antecedent debt is value, though holding that
security of such debt is not value, and it has sometimes been held
that both cases involve value. (This being also the view of the Uniform Sales Act.) Furthermore, it is usually (perhaps universally)
held that if a creditor, taking security for an antecedent debt,
agrees to extend time for a definite period, the length of which
seems to be immaterial, he is a bona fide purchaser, at least if he is
not charged with notice before the period of extension expires. Of
course there is more here than mere security of an antecedent debt,
viz., the promise not to sue, and there is more than mere promise
after the period of extension has expired, viz. there is performance.
But is there any difference from the point of view of substantial
change of position?
How about the creditor who fixes a lien on the property by attachment, judgment, or execution? It would not be absurd to call
such a creditor a "purchaser," that being in this context a technical
term. But the rule against antecedent value stands in the way, and
while that rule has been relaxed by some courts, the editor does not
know of any single case which has held that such a creditor is a
purchaser for value. But suppose the creditor's proceeding goes on
to execution sale and, as usual, the creditor buys at that sale
for the amount of his judgment or a lesser sum, which is credited
on the judgment after deducting the sheriff's fees: is the creditor
now a purchaser for value? Authorities differ on this point and so
you have a question to consider "on principle." Which way do
you go?
There are a few decisions that even a third person who
purchases at execution sale ~nd pays cash is not a bona fide
purchaser because the sheriff does not purport to give a good title
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but only to sell the interest of the judgment debtor, whatever that
may be. Compare purchase by quitclaim deed.
In examining decisions regarding title at execution sale,
whether of third person purchaser or creditor purchaser, it is important to distinguish between the case of defect in the judgment
or in the execution procedure and the case of defect in the debtor's
title, a distinction which has not always been observed in encyclopaedic citations.
Inadequacy of consideration is immaterial, except as evidence
on the issue of good faith. And when the consideration for a transfer is in part present value and in part discharge (or security) of
an antecedent debt, it has been held that the purchaser, if without
notice, is fully protected. Yet, where a purchaser pays part of the
agreed price without notice of the prior interest and then receives
notice before he has completed his payments, it seems never to
have been held that the prior interest is cut off, simpliciter. On the
other hand, there is little if any authority (some of the cases are
obscure) for the view that the purchaser is not to be protected at
all. There are two respectable lines of authority, one giving the
purchaser an equitable lien for what he has paid before notice, the
other giving him the property subject to an equitable lien in favor
of the prior party for the unpaid balance of the price. Which is the
better solution? Is either one right? How do they square with the
decisions on mixed consideration, or the decisions on inadequate
consideration? Suppose A has paid X dollars as the whole price of
land worth 2X dollars, and B has paid Y dollars as half the price of
land worth 2Y dollars? And there is an interesting problem of constructive notice in some of these partial payment cases. Suppose
the purchaser pays part of the price on an instalment contract, and
then the instrument which created the prior interest is recorded:
does the record give notice to the purchaser?22 Note that in cases
where the purchase money is not fully paid before notice, you are
likely to find that there is no conveyance before notice, raising
another question which will be touched on later.
We have seen that the definition of value has been relaxed in
favor of the purchaser of negotiable paper, but even he cannot
make a case on mere promise of value. What, then, shall we say of
the case of a bank which, without notice of defect in its customer's
title, receives from the latter a check which it credits to his ac22

See Jaeger v. Hardy, 48 Ohio St. 335, 27 N.E. 863 (1891).
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count? Is it, without more, a holder in due course? If not, what
more is needed? Suppose the bank, still without notice, sets off
the deposit against the depositor's note? Suppose that, when the
deposit is received, the bank holds the depositor's note for a sum
exceeding the total deposit, but it does not act in the way of bookkeeping set-off until after notice? Suppose the wrongful deposit is
followed by a series of deposits and withdrawals, the account
always showing a balance in excess of the amount of the wrongful
deposit until notice of the adverse interest is received?
What Is the Legal Effect of Purchase in Good Faith? In our
cursory examination of the definitions of value and good faith,
we have found considerable unity in the subject, along with considerable diversity, the unities perhaps preponderant. As we go on
to other aspects of bona fide purchase, we shall find diversities so
great that family resemblance alm~st disappears.
Can we say that one who is a purchaser (giving value in the
fullest sense) in good faith (without notice, actual or constructive) necessarily gets good title? Of course, we cannot. Neither
would it be wise to say that "in general" the bona fide purchaser
prevails, and then state exceptions to that rule, for that has not
been the common law approach. We started with "the fundamental principle of property, which secures the title of the original
owner against a wrongful disposition by another, and which does
not permit one to transfer a better title than he has. The party who
claims the benefit of the exception to this principle must come
within all the conditions on which it depends." 23 In other words, a
bona fide purchaser, like any other transferee, ordinarily gets no
better title than his transferor had. How far, then, and in what
cases, does the bona fide purchaser rise to a higher level? No
useful answer to this question is possible, except one framed in
terms of particular species of bona fide purchase.
The Equitable Doctrine of Bona Fide Purchase. In its oldest
form, the doctrine seems to have been purely defensive, and to
have drawn no distinction between legal and equitable estates. To
a bill seeking equitable relief with respect to property, it was a
good plea, excusing answer, to show purchase in good faith. 24 In
course of time, the doctrine developed into a rule of property
23 Justice Campbell in Combs v. Hodge, 21
24 See Bassett v. Nosworthy, Rep. t. Finch

How. (62 U.S.) 397 at 405 (1858).
102, 23 Eng. Rep. 55 (1673), a bill filed
by an ,heir against a purchaser from devisees for discovery of a revocation of the will.
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which could be made the basis of affirmative relief to the purchaser,
but it was at the same time narrowed to the terms familiar today,
viz. that bona fide purchase of a legal estate cuts off outstanding
equities. The type case is bona fide purchase from a trustee (selling
wrongfully, not in the exercise of a power of sale) cutting off the interest of cestui. A case of particular interest in this course is that of
purchase of the legal estate cutting off equitable liens. It happens,
however, that this is not nearly as frequent here as in England.
Reasons: In England, all junior mortgages are merely equitable,
while here they are probably legal; there money is frequently lent
upon a mere deposit of title deeds, creating an equitable lien, while
here that practice is almost unknown; and finally our recording acts
cut across this field and, where they apply, make the distinction
between legal and equitable interests immaterial. Of course, the
land recording system is much more complete than the chattel
recording system, and so there is more room for the operation of
the equity rule of bona fide purchase in the latter case than in the
former. Per contra, the fugitive nature of chattels disposes of
priority problems in fortuitous ways (identification, proof of title
history, etc.) and perhaps it is a stand off.
Most of the reported cases involve purchase of the fee simple
of land or the corresponding "absolute ownership" of chattels, and
the rule is commonly stated in terms of purchase of "the legal
title." There is, however, good authority for the protection of a
bona fide purchaser of a lesser legal interest, e.g., a term for years,
as against a prior equitable interest. What, for the purpose of this
equity rule, is the nature of a mortgage, in those states which say
that it does not transfer title but merely creates a lien? Is it a legal
lien or an equitable lien? The question may arise in either of two
ways: (1) mortgage followed by bona fide purchase from mortgagor, or (2) trust or equitable lien followed by mortgage by the
trustee or the owner subject to the equitable lien, with value given
in good faith by the mortgagee or by an assignee. Of course, as indicated above, most of the cases of either type will be governed by
the recording acts, but a few escape the provisions of the statutes
and turn, or may be made to turn, on the equity rule.
Emphasis on legal title has been carried this far, that even
when the transferor has legal title and the purchaser parts with
money in good faith, the latter is not protected unless he obtains
a conveyance before notice. But this objection has often been
surmounted, in one way or another, and this is rather to be ex-
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pected if the purchaser's case is properly handled, because the
objection is so artificial. The point which goes to the justice
of the purchaser's claim is change of position without notice, and
if we insist on legal title at all it should be merely insistence on
such title in the vendor, inviting the purchaser's reliance. In this
respect, the case in hand is very different from that to which the
English courts applied their famous doctrine of tacking. There a
purchaser of an equity who found the legal title in a third person
could get in that title and thereby protect his equity. There are
miscellaneous cases here in which the bona fide purchaser of
an equitable estate, the legal title being outstanding, has been protected against prior equities, but it is doubtful whether any one
of them can be regarded as authority for a general rule protecting
the purchaser of an equity. It will usually be found that the case
went off on the theory that the prior claimant was estopped by his
conduct. Sometimes there is talk of "superior equities:" That may
be regarded as an informal expression of the estoppel principle,
but in some instances it ·pretty clearly involves the idea that
equitable interests are of various rank, so that the king can take
the queen and the queen can take the jack. The difficulty with
the latter notion is that there is no agreement on the grading
system. All that comes clear is the general rule that, as between
competing equities, the prior prevails, bona fide purchase going
for naught, and the estoppel 'exception based on the prior claimant's conduct.
What do you think of the equity rule, from the point of view
of justice and policy? What do you think of its general shape,
and what do you think of its details? The question is worth serious
thought because, among other things, it will lead you into a consideration of the actual working of the law. The reports do not
indicate that the judges have been much moved by considerations
of policy, yet the absence of policy argument in the opinions is not
convincing evidence that policy has not actuated the decisions.25

[To be concluded.]
. 25 An illuminating discussion of the equity doctrine will be found in HUSTON,
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY 114-148 (1915). A useful collection of cases, chiefly
under the equity rule, will be found in 23 AM. & ENG. ENc., 2d ed., 472 (1903), title,
Purchaser for Value and Without Notice. In CYc. and C.J., and in the American Digest,
there is no such head, and the cases are gathered with considerable confusion of the
several rules, under Vendor and Purchaser (land), Sales (chattels and some choses in
action), Mortgages (land), Chattel Mortgages, Pledges, Contracts, Assignments, Execution,
Judicial Sales, and who knows how many other heads.

